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ABSTRACT 
Information systems within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) need trustworthy enforcement of critical security 
policies against sophisticated attackers. Data, such as 
email, is processed on these systems on a daily basis. 
Since this data may contain sensitive information, special 
handling is required to prevent unauthorized disclosure. 
For these reasons, a high assurance Multilevel secure (MLS) 
Local Area Network (LAN) was developed to control the 
sharing of information at different security levels. 
A challenge in multilevel environments is to provide a 
usable and meaningful interface to users via the email 
clients. These email clients interact with the high 
assurance server running on the MLS LAN. The high 
assurance server returns information at security levels at 
or below those of the client. An email client is only able 
to write and manipulate mail at its level. Therefore, 
client systems should provide users with feedback regarding 
operations they are able to perform. 
In this research, six criteria were established to 
examine email clients. These criteria evaluated messages 
displayed to users via the email clients. All of the email 
v 
clients was able to satisfy at least one of the established 
criteria. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many Department of Defense (DoD) information systems 
contain critical information. A large amount of this 
information is considered sensitive and requires special 
handling. Therefore, both single-level and multilevel 
systems are required. Additionally, good user interfaces 
are needed so that these systems will be acceptable to 
users. 
In the sections that follow, various aspects of 
single-level and multilevel systems will be discussed and 
the objectives of this research will be described. 
A. SINGLE-LEVEL AND MULTILEVEL SYSTEMS 
A single-level system is one in which all users of the 
system are cleared for the highest level of information on 
that system. All information regardless of its original 
classification will be classified at the level of the 
system. For example, if a computer was classified as top 
secret, then all of the information contained on that 
system will also be classified as top secret. 
In general, a collection of single-level systems is 
used to manage data classified at different sensitivity 
levels. In the case of networks, each level is allocated 
1 
the Department of Defense are part of such networks. For 
example, systems used to read or write military messages 
operate as single-level systems. Systems used to transfer 
highly sensitive correspondence between DoD agencies are 
also single-level. 
When single-level systems are employed, users are 
given accounts on as many networks as they are authorized 
to have access. Thus users are forced to logon at 
different workstations to access information, such as 
email, at different sensitivity levels. For example, if a 
user wanted to read both top secret and secret email, 
access to separate networks at these levels would be 
required. 
Single-level systems are neither efficient nor cost 
effective. Several problems are associated with single-
level systems. The first is the requirement to purchase 
redundant systems and networks for each sensitivity level. 
Another problem is the requirement for secure environments 
such as vaults, cipher-locked rooms and guarded rooms which 
must be used to house single-level systems containing 
highly sensitive information. 
With the emergence of new joint environments and the 
needs of dynamic coalitions, single-level systems are 
2 
inadequate to meet the requirements of the Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Communities. Multilevel 
systems offer a viable solution for these communities. 
A multilevel system allows users to logon to a single 
computer system and access their information at different 
sensitivity levels thus eliminating the need to purchase 
numerous machines or networks. The user can read 
information equal to or below his or her current session 
level. These types of systems enforce a mandatory 
security policy called a mandatory access control (MAC) 
policy. These systems support subjects and objects each of 
which is assigned a sensitivity level. A subject is an 
"active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, 
or device that causes information to flow among objects or 
changes the state of the system" [1] . An object is defined 
as a "passive entity that contains or receives information. 
Examples of objects are records, blocks, pages, files and 
directories"[l]. When addressing secrecy in mandatory 
policy enforcement systems, two rules ensure that a subject 
will not gain access to data or a file unless the subject 
has the proper sensitivity level. First, enforcement of a 
MAC policy does not allow a subject to write down from a 
higher sensitivity level to an object at a lower 
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sensi ti vi ty level (i.e. top secret to secret) . Second, 
these systems do not allow a subject at a lower sensitivity 
level to read from objects at higher sensitivity levels 
( i . e. secret to top secret) . By enforcing these rules, 
systems that implement MAC policies are able to constrain 
the access to objects by subjects "even in the face of 
Trojan Horses and other malicious software"[l]. 
B. PURPOSE OF THIS RESEARCH 
When any type of software is written and released, the 
software must provide usability. Usability "is a 
combination of the following user-oriented characteristics: 
ease of learning, high speed of user task performance, low 
user error rate,. subjective user satisfaction and user 
retention over time" [ 17] . The problem with multilevel 
secure systems is their ine1.bility to provide a "user-
friendly" interface. In the MLS LAN, the multilevel secure 
base causes the IMAP server to return messages and error 
codes to clients in response to unauthorized access 
requests. The ability of a client to provide meaningful 
feedback to users when such error codes are returned will 
affect the perceived usability of the secure system. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine user 
interface issues for COTS software in a multilevel secure 
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environment. Specifically, we will examine the interfaces 
provided by email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, 
Netscape Messenger, Lotus Notes, Pine, and Postal when used 
in conjunction with an Internet Message Access Protocol 
{IMAP) server executing on and constrained by a high 
assurance multilevel base. 
In this research, the interfaces presented by each of 
the email clients operating in a multilevel context will be 
evaluated against six usability criteria. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To determine whether email clients in a multilevel 
environment present users with a "user-friendly" in.terface, 
the following questions are addressed in this thesis. 
1. Do any of the email clients properly capture the "read 
only" and "read/write" responses sent by the IMAP server 
to the email client and properly display the responses to 
the user? 
2. Does the email client disregard the responses {"read 
only", "read/write") that are forwarded by the IMAP 
server? 
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3. Can clients be configured to receive the "read only" and 
"read/write" responses? If so, what is presented to the 
users by the clients when such responses are received? 
4. If clients cannot be reconfigured to receive the "read 
only" and "read/write" responses, what possible changes 
to the source code of the email clients would be required 
to improve their usability? 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This chapter has given a brief overview of single-
level and multilevel systems. Additionally, this chapter 
has stated that the problem with many MLS systems is their 
inability to provide a "user-friendly" interface. Chapter 
II gives an overview of security policies and secure system 
terminology. Chapter III describes the components of the 
MLS LAN. Chapter IV explains why IMAP was chosen over Post 
Office Protocol (POP) for the email server. Chapter V 
explains how well the email clients performed during the 
examination. Chapter VI gives the conclusions and the 
possible future work of this thesis. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY POLICIES AND SECURE SYSTEM 
TERMINOLOGY 
A. COMPUTER SECURITY 
Computer security relates to how an organization 
protects its information and resources. Its objectives can 
be described in terms of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. Confidentiality is the prevention of the 
unauthorized disclosure of information; integrity is the 
prevention of the unauthorized modification of information; 
and availability is the prevention of the unauthorized 
withholding of information resources [6]. 
Prior to the extensive use of networking, most 
classified and unclassified computer systems could only be 
accessed by users physically proximate to the systems. 
Securing computer assets was often limited to guards, 
vaults and. combination/cipher locked rooms. When systems 
are networked, physical security alone is inadequate to 
protect computer systems and data contained therein. 
According to the National Research Council: 
We are at risk. America depends on computers. 
They control power delivery, cormnunications, 
aviation, and financial services. They are used 
to store vital information, from medical records 
to business plans, to criminal records. Although 
we trust them, they are vulnerable to the effects 
of poor design, and insufficient quality control, 
7 





thief can steal 
more with a computer than with a gun. Tomorrow's 
terrorist may be able to do more damage with a 
keyboard than with a bomb. As you can see, 
computer systems are vital in our everyday lives, 
we must therefore, become more active in 
protecting this vital resource [5]. 
Therefore, in order for computer security to be 
effective, it must be usable so that it is embraced not 
only by top management but by everyone within an 
·organization. 
B. SECURITY POLICY 
A fundamental aspect of computer security is a well-
formulated security policy. A security policy is defined 
in terms of protecting an identified resource from 
unauthorized use. This identified resource must be 
tangible or have some form that is tangible [8]. 
The main objective of any security policy is to 
prevent or protect the identified resource from active 
threats. These threats include unauthorized distribution 
of classified information and unauthorized dissemination of 
an organization-related information. The objective is only 
meaningful if the organization for which the policy exists 
either owns the resource or exercises control over the 
resource [8]. 
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A security policy might not state 
requirements for anyone within an organization. 
specific 
Instead, 
it might state general requirements such as the handling of 
sensitive information and the types of clearances held by 
those with certain positions within an organization. For 
example, the security policy could state different 
managers' responsibilities with respect to the enforcement 
of the security policy. 
1. Integrity & Confidentiality Policies 
a. Integrity 
Integrity is concerned with preventing the 
unauthorized modification of data. It is concerned with 
creation, deletion, writing, and changing the status of 
data. Integrity is utilized in both the commercial and 
military sectors. When a mandatory integrity policy is 
enforced, a user at a low integrity level would be 
prevented from writing or modifying high integrity level 
information. The write operation would be denied because 
the lower integrity information might contaminate higher 
integrity information. 
In the corrunercial sector, integrity is used to 
control fraud and error. It is required by businesses that 
utilize data processing for accounting and management 
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purposes. For example, an organization's individual 
customer orders could be considered low integrity, so all 
employees might be able to modify it. However, an 
inventory listing might be considered high integrity data, 
so only managers would be able to modify it. 
b. Secrecy 
Secrecy is concerned with the unauthorized 
disclosure of sensitive information. It can also be 
referred· to as confidentiality. It is the primary policy 
used by the military to "regulate the control of classified 
information within the government"[?]. 
The military policy is enforced by adding 
sensitivity labels to subjects and objects. In a computer, 
these are reflected as sensitivity levels and may provide 
additional granularity by assigning access categories; all 
of which determine the information the users will be 
allowed to access. 
2. Mandatory and Discretionary Policies 
An access control policy details the rules that are 
necessary to enforce the security policy. The two types of 
access control polices are Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies. 
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a. Mandato~ Access Control (MAC) Policies 
"A mandatory policy can provide protection 
against unauthorized modification of information as well as 
protection against unauthorized disclosure"[6]. It is a 
policy that constrains subjects' (users/owners) access to 
objects (information within a computer such as files, data, 
and databases). A MAC policy is enforced by regulating the 
flow of information between sensitivity or classification 
levels. 
A MAC policy is usually in effect in 
organizations, such as the DoD, that utilize background 
checks for personnel clearances, hierarchical 
classifications and security clearances (e.g. top secret, 
secret [6]). Corporations also use MAC policies to reflect 
security policies associated with proprietary information. 
(1) Bell and LaPadula (BLP) model. The 
Bell and LaPadula model is the most widely used security 
model for MAC policies. The Bell and LaPadula model is 
used by the DoD to implement its security policy [6]. It 
is based on attributes of subjects and objects within a 
system. These attributes can be defined as security levels 
(top secret, secret, confidential, and unclassified). The 
model is based on the notion of a secure state. When the 
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system is in a secure state, each subject has access only 
to those objects to which the subject is authorized. The 
BLP model has defined rules that allow computer systems to 
transition from one secure state to another. Access in the 
system is determined by means of the dominance relationship 
between objects and subjects. It "specifies read and write 
access between a subject and an object based upon the 
dominance relationship between the subject's label (or 
access class) and the object's label (or access class) ". 
For example, if Bob has a top-secret clearance and wants to 
access file "foo" which is labeled secret, Bob's label 
dominates the label of file "foo", so Bob can access file 
"foo". 
In the Bell and LaPadula security 
model, the MAC policy is expressed through two properties 
that must be maintained. The two properties are the simple 
security property and the star property. The simple 
security property states that no subject is authorized to 
read information above his/her sensitivity level. This 
means, if a person is currently logged on at secret, he/she 
cannot read top-secret information. Second, the star "*" 
property states that no subject is authorized to copy 
12 
information from an object with a high sensitivity level to 
one of a low sensitivity level. 
( 2) Biba model. As with the Bell and 
LaPadula, the Biba model is also based on the attributes of 
the subjects and the objects. This model is concerned with 
modeling a system that enforces a mandatory integrity 
policy. 
levels. 
Objects and subjects are both assigned integrity 
It has two properties, the simple property and the 
star "*" property. The simple property states that no 
subject is authorized to read information below its 
integrity level. The star "*" property states that a 
subject cannot write information to an object with an 
integrity level above the integrity level of the subject. 
A MAC policy has several advantages. 
The main advantage is that it separates broad integrity and 
confidentiality classes by affixing labels to subjects and 
objects. Therefore, "a MAC policy offers verifiable 
restriction on the flow of information" [ 6] . The second 
advantage of MAC is that it provides protection against 
malicious software such as Trojan horses. 
b. Discretiona~ Access Control (DAC)Policies 
An owner-controlled DAC policy allows users to 
specify who will have access to their objects within a 
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particular computer system. Therefore, users can grant and 
revoke privileges such as read, write and execute on the 
files and other data that they have created or own. 
Systems enforcing a DAC policy are often easier 
to implement and less costly than systems enforcing a MAC 
policy. Problems arise however with this policy because of 
the revocation and propagation of privileges and the 
susceptibility of DAC systems to malicious software. With 
the revocation of privileges, when an owner grants 
privileges (read, write, execute) to other users and then 
wants to revoke access to the information, revocation can 
be a problem. The other users can copy the information and 
pass it on to additional users. At this point, the owner no 
longer controls who has access to the information. 
Therefore, the information may be accessible to users whom 
the original owner never intended access. A DAC policy is 
susceptible to malicious software such as Trojan Horses. A 
Trojan Horse is "software that appears to the user to be 
performing one function while it hides some other, often 
malicious function" [ 9] . These Trojan Horses could leak 
information to unauthorized users. For example, if only a 
DAC mechanism was in place and a Trojan Horse was present, 
data classified as secret could be copied to data 
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classified as confidential. This would be in contradiction 
to the intended handling for the data. 
3. Trusted Computing Base (TCB) 
As a policy implementation, the Trusted Computing Base 
(TCB) contains all the protection mechanisms within a 
computer system. It defines the security perimeter of the 
system. It is defined by the security policy implemented by 
the organization. The TCB includes the identification and 
authentication (I&A) mechanism, access mediation mechanism, 
DAC functions and audit trail. "It contains databases that 
represent the security policy of an organization. These 
internal databases are used by the TCB to create the 
abstraction of subjects and objects which are entities 
outside of the TCB "[6]. 
C. ASSURANCE OBJECTIVES 
Assurance is the measure of confidence that a security 
policy is being enforced correctly. It determines how well 
the computer system meets the requirements set forth in the 
security policy. The assurance lifecycle process controls 
the requirements, design documentation, implementation, 
configuration management, distribution and maintenance of 
the system. Assurance can be classified from high to low. 
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High assurance systems have security built into them 
from the beginning of the lifecycle. These sys terns have 
undergone extensive examination and have been found to be 
highly secure. On the other hand, low assurance systems' 
security features are usually added rather than built-in 
from the beginning; thus making these systems less secure. 
1. Reference Monitor Concept 
urn order to achieve the desired execution control of 
users programs, the concept of a Reference Monitor is used. 
The function of the reference monitor is to validate all 
references (to programs, data, peripherals, etc) made by 
programs in execution against those authorized for the 
subjects (users, etc). The reference monitor not only is 
responsible to assure that the references are authorized to 
shared resource objects, but also to assure that the 
reference is the right kind (read, or read and write, 
etc.)" [16] . This concept is an abstraction that describes 
the necessary and sufficient functions required to enforce 
the policy by which subjects access objects. By supplying 
the necessary functions, the reference monitor must mediate 
all access to objects by subjects. In order to be 
sufficient, the reference monitor must meditate all access 
to objects by subjects and no additional access validation 
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needs to be performed. This concept is necessary to 
describe how a subject causes information flow between 
objects thereby changing the state of the system. An 
abstract Reference Monitor is pictured below and contains 
the current access authorizations, reference validation 
mechanism, audit trail, and the authorization database. 
The authorization database reflects the security policy. 
The current access authorizations describe what object a 
subject has access to and the rights or modes (read, write, 
execute) the subject has on that object [ 19] . The 
reference validation mechanism ensures that no unauthorized 
access will occur and the audit trail is used to provide a 










Figure 1 Reference Validation Mechanism 
2. Security Kernel 
A Security Kernel is a reference validation mechanism. 
As an implementation of the reference monitor, it attempts 
to achieve the following goals: it must be tamperproof, 
always invoked, and small enough to be analyzed. 
By being tamperproof, the security kernel must 
separate its functions, from other operating system 
functions, thus aiding in the prevention of modification or 
tampering of its internal data. Because it is always 
invoked, the security kernel meditates every access to an 
object by a subject. For verifiability, it must be "small 
enough to be proven that it is correct" [6]. The security 
kernel includes hardware, software and firmware. A 
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general-purpose security kernel provides the following 
properties and functions: 
• creation of objects and subjects 
• self-protecting 
• enforces the security policy 
• performs low-level resource management 
3. Evaluation of Systems 
Systems are evaluated to determine the amount of 
trustworthiness that can be placed in them. Evaluation of 
systems helps to determine that a system performs according 
to its design and specification. Criteria are used to 
provide comparable and consistent evaluations. Different 




enforcement of system security policy. The 
sections describe two criteria for secure 
a. Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC} 
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
(TCSEC) provides the basis for evaluating the effectiveness 
of security controls built into computer systems[18]. 
Different evaluation classes are used according to the 
amount of trust needed in the system. For instance, if 
everyone was cleared at the same level, very little trust 
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is needed in the system; therefore very little assurance is 
needed. Organizations with users having different 
clearances require systems with greater trust to ensure 
users only access data they are authorized. 
The TCSEC serves the following purposes: "1) to 
provide a standard to manufacturers as to what security 
features to build into their new and planned, commercial 
products in order to provide widely available systems that 
satisfy trust requirements (with particular emphasis on 
preventing the disclosure of data) for sensitive 
application, 2) to provide· DoD components with a metric 
with which to evaluate the degree of trust that can be 
placed in computer systems for the secure processing of 
classified and other sensitive information, and 3) to 
provide a basis for specifying requirements in acquisition 
specifications "[9]. The criteria has four divisions (A, B, 
C, D) with A being the highest assurance and D being the 
lowest. Each division is subdivided into classes. 
Additional security features and assurance requirements are 
added as the classes advance in number and as the divisions 
are increased. Therefore, organizations gain more 
assurance of correct security policy enforcement in an Al 




b. Common Criteria for Information Technology 
for Security Evaluation 
The Common Criteria for Information Technology 
for Security Evaluation (CCITSE) [9] or Common Criteria is 
the replacement criteria for several earlier security 
evaluation criteria. It is an attempt at having one 
standard criteria for the United States, Canada and Europe. 
The CCITSE contains classes that are subdivided into 
families. The functional classes (components) are listed 
below: 
Table 1 Functional Classes of the CCITSE 
Functional Class Name 
Communication 
Identification and Authorization 
Privacy 






User Data Protection 











Security functional components are used to 
express a wide range of security functional 
requirements within protection profiles and 
security targets) . Components are ordered sets of 
functional elements. These sets are grouped into 
families with common objectives (e.g. Security 
Audit Trail Protection) and classes with common 
intent (e.g. Audit) [1]. 
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III. NPS MLS LAN OVERVIEW 
A. MLS LAN DESCRIPTION 
Numerous problems are present in systems that do not 
enforce a mandatory security policy. These problems 
include redundant equipment for each sensitivity level, 
excessive clearances for personnel, incoherent views 
because data is spread across multiple systems, 
inconsistent content, and untimely information because data 
must be physically placed in each system [4]. In order to 
eliminate these inefficiencies, the NPS MLS LAN was built. 
1. OVerview of NPS MLS LAN and Architecture 
The NPS MLS LAN is comprised of an XTS-300 which 
provides a Trusted Computing Base (TCB), personal computers 
(PCs) equipped with a Trusted Computing Base Extension 
. (TCBE), and COTS software. Figure 2 shows the MLS LAN and 
all of its components. The MLS LAN components will be 














Figure 2 MLS LAN Architecture 





The Wang Federal System XTS-300, a high assurance 
system, is the server platform for the MLS LAN. It is a 
Class B3 rated system under TCSEC. "The policy that the 
XTS-300 enforces is the DoD policy on multilevel security 
computing as formalized in the National Computer Security 
Center (NCSC) approved Bell and LaPadula model. It also 
enforces the integrity policy formulated by the Biba model" 
[10]. It also enforces a DAC policy. 
The MAC policy is enforced by the XTS-300 by having 
labels on objects and subjects. The reference monitor 
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implementation within the security kernel then mediates all 
access by subjects to objects. 
The XTS-300 enforces both a confidentiality policy and 
an integrity policy as expressed by the Bell and LaPadula 
and Biba models respectively. 
The XTS-300 STOP operating system supports a ring 
protection mechanism. "A ring is used to isolate portions 
of a process from tampering. Four rings are used to 
augment the security in the XTS-300" [10]. Ring 0 is the 
most privileged and contains the security kernel. Ring 1 
provides networking, input/output (I/0), file system 
management, and DAC policy enforcement. Ring 2 contains 
the STOP trusted software, user-developed trusted code and 
the untrusted Commodity Application System Services (CASS). 
Ring 3 is reserved for untrusted applications. The XTS-300 
negotiates all accesses to objects by subjects. This is how 
an organization's policy is enforced regardless of the 
application executing in Ring 3[11]. 
The XTS-300 provides a trusted path. The purpose of 
the trusted path is to provide a trusted communication link 
between the user and the XTS-300 and vice versa. Once a 
trusted path is established, the user can login, set 
levels, and perform other trusted functions. It also gives 
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the user the ability to change his/her sensitivity level. 
To invoke a trusted path, 
Attention Key (SAK). 
3. Client Workstation 
the user presses a Secure 
The client workstations are COTS PCs equipped with a 
Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) . These PCs are 
networked to the XTS-300. "This architecture supports 
rapid upgrades of COTS software because the PCs are 
untrusted components of the MLS LAN. Therefore, a network 
administrator can simply upgrade the software on the PC and 
allow continued operation" [3] . 
MLS LAN is the TCBE. 
A trusted component of the 
The TCBE is the critical component for creating a 
trusted path within the MLS LAN. "The TCBE negotiates a 
trusted path between the workstation and the server. The 
user initiates this trusted path across the network with 
the XTS-300 when he/she sends the Secure Attention Sequence 
( SAS ) II [ 3 ] . Once the sequence is sent across the network, 
"the user is then able to use the trusted path to initiate 
a secure session on the XTS-300" [3]. When the user has a 
secure session, he/she can begin to securely view email or 
send other data across the network. 
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In addition to providing a trusted path, the TCBE also 
prevents the object reuse problem and is used for hardware 
identification and authentication (HW I &A). It uses public 
key and symmetric cryptography to encrypt communications 
between itself and the XTS-300. 
4. Application Software Systems 













workstation model. This workstation model allows users to 
have a small workstation with modest computing power. 
Servers are the focus for data storage and manipulation. 
For example, the IMAP server performs all manipulation of 
the email. The manipulation is initiated when the client 
sends a command to the server and the server responds. 
Appendix A illustrates an interactive session between the 
IMAP server and Microsoft Outlook, a client email program. 
27 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
28 
IV. EMAIL PROTOCOLS 
A. OVERVIEW OF EMAIL PROTOCOLS 
Once the components of the MLS LAN were selected, the 
next step was to select the appropriate Internet-based 
protocol to run on the system. 
considered were POP and IMAP. 
The two protocols 
IMAP and POP are client/server systems. A client 
initiates commands and the server responds to those 
commands. The results of server processing are often 
returned to the client. These protocols are considered to 
be Message Retrieval Agents (MRA) . An MRA is "a service 
that retrieves messages from a mailbox on a remote server 
to a Message User Agent (MUA)"[20] or client email program. 
B. COMPARISON OF THE POP AND IMAP 
1. Overview of POP 
POP is the most common protocol in use today. It can 
work in any environment, but it is not intended to 
manipulate email on the server. POP works best when a 
single workstation is being utilized to process the email. 
POP functions primarily as an off-line email 
processing tool. With this protocol, a client is configured 
in advance to either leave email on the server or direct 
the server to delete email once it is downloaded. 
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If the 
email is left on the server, the user cannot manipulate 
(read, reply to, delete, etc.) the email in any way. If 
email is downloaded to the workstation, the email is either 
deleted from the server or a copy is left on the server 
[ 2] . Once the email is downloaded from the server to a 
particular workstation, it is not accessible from a 
different workstation via the server. 
With POP, a Transport Control Protocol (TCP) 
connection is made between the client workstation and the 
server. Once the connection is made, the user is then 
authenticated to the server. Following the authentication, 
the user is permitted to manipulate his/her mailbox. At 
that point, the client issues POP commands and the server 
responds to those commands. 
2. OVerview of IMAP 
IMAP is a protocol that provides more functionality 
than POP. It allows the user to access email from more 
than one client. It permits the manipulation of mailboxes 
(remote message folders) as though the mailboxes were 
local. This gives the user the ability to access email 
from home, the office, or even while traveling; all without 
the need to transfer messages or files between these 






between IMAP and POP are described in the following 
paragraphs. 
IMAP functions as an online, offline, and disconnected 
email processing tool while POP functions only as an 
offline tool. urn online mode, email is delivered to the 
server, and then the user manipulates the email messages 
from his/her workstation". Offline is when mail is 
delivered to a (usually shared) server, and a user at a 
workstation uperiodically invokes a email client program 
that connects to the server and downloads all the pending 
email to the user's workstation. Thereafter, all mail 
processing is local to the client's workstation" [2] . In 
disconnected mode, a copy of the email is downloaded to the 
client workstation. Then the client disconnects from the 
server. Changes may be made to the email and when the 
client reconnects to the server, the changes are uploaded 
to the server. Additionally, IMAP functions in an 
interactive client server mode. This means that an IMAP 
client can ask the server for headers, for the bodies of 
specified messages, or to search for messages meeting 
certain requirements [2]. So, when the client invokes the 
IMAP server, it can manipulate the mail on the server. A 
copy of the email may be stored locally on the client, but 
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the client is not considered to be the permanent email 
repository. 
Like POP, a user must be authenticated to the server 
prior to accessing any email. From that point, the client 
issues the LIST command to get a list of available 
mailboxes. The user then selects the desired mailbox for 
manipulation. At that point, the user is allowed to view or 
manipulate the email within the selected mailbox. 
3. Advantages of POP 
When a user accesses his /her email remotely, he/ she 
only needs to connect to the server to download his/her 
email to the workstation. POP also saves expensive disk 
space on the server by downloading the email to the user's 
workstation. This feature enables the client to save 
his/her email for an unspecified amount of time. This is 
in contrast to IMAP where the email is saved on the server, 
therefore, giving the administrator the ability to specify 
how long email will be kept. 
POP has only thirteen commands within its command set 
while IMAP has twenty-two commands. This makes POP easier 
to implement and a much simpler protocol to learn. 
Additionally, because POP is so popular, more client 
software is available for it. 
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4. Advantages of IMAP 
IMAP provides the ability to "store and fetch" 
messages. It supports concurrent access and updates on 
shared mailboxes . Clients are informed of changes by a 
change in the mailbox state. These changes are pushed from 
the server. This is useful because it gives all users the 
ability to view updates as they occur. Additionally, IMAP 
allows users to access their email from more than one 
computer. This gives users more flexibility as they travel 
and login remotely. Last, IMAP offers support for online, 
offline, and disconnected modes, which is used for 
accessing mailboxes remotely. 
5. Advantage of POP in an MLS Environment 
In a MLS environment, the one advantage of POP is that 
if offers a small connection time when email messages are 
being downloaded. This small connection time lowers the 
exposure of the communication traffic on the network. 
6. Advantages of IMAP in an MLS Environment 
There are several advantages to using IMAP in an MLS 
environment. The first advantage is that IMAP aids in 
helping to solve the object reuse problem because it keeps 
the email on the server. "Object reuse is defined as the 
reassignment to some subject of a medium (e.g., page frame, 
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disk sector, magnetic tape) that contained one or more 
objects. To be securely reassigned, such media must 
contain no residual data from the previously contained 
objects"[l]. To ensure that no residual data remains on the 
client, all data will be purged between sessions. 
mail cannot be stored on client workstation. 
Clearly, 
Second, 
because IMAP stores the email on the server; the user can 
gain access to multiple mailboxes vice only one with POP. 
Unlike POP, IMAP gives the users the ability to access 
their incoming and outgoing messages from different 
computers and at different times. Therefore, users can 
still access their incoming and stored email on the MLS LAN 
while on travel. 
C. OVERVIEW OF IMAP OPERATIONS 
Operations within IMAP enable the creation, . deletion 
and the renaming of mailboxes, the removal of messages, 
checks for new messages, searches for messages, selective 
fetches of messages according to attributes and text, 
setting and clearing of flags, and parsing (RFC-822 and 
MIME). IMAP is also compatible with Internet message 
standards and does not require the client software to have 
any knowledge of the server's file format. It contains 
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flags, states and commands, all of which are described 
below. 
IMAP uses six flags and four states. The six flags 
that indicate the status of message and are: 
answered, flagged, recent, draft, and deleted. The four 
states are: the non-authenticated state, authenticated 
state, selected state and the logout state. "The non-
authenticated state follows after the connection to the 
server is made. After the client is authenticated, the 
authenticated state is entered" [4]. Once a mailbox is 
selected, the IMAP server enters the Selected State. In 
this state, the user manipulates his/her email. Once the 
user disconnects from the server, the system enters the 
logout state. 
D. EMAIL CLIENTS 
Email clients allow users to· read, receive, write, 
forward, save, print, export, and delete email messages. 
Each email program offers GUis (Graphical User Interfaces) . 
These GUis range from simple to complex depending upon the 
client. The clients support SMTP (Simple Mail Transport 
Protocol), MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions), 
NNTP (Network News Transport Protocol), IMAP, and POP. The 
key features offered with each email client differentiate 
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it from other clients. These differences will be discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
1. Netscape Messenger 
Nets cape Messenger is a part of the Nets cape 
Communicator package. Messenger provides an HTML editor 
which supports bullets, table paragraph aligning, font 
size, font color, etc.; data encryption; digital 
signatures, organization/prioritization of email; and 
access to messages from multiple locations and computers 
[ 12] . It also allows users to import email from other 
email programs such as Microsoft Outlook, to set up email 
folders, and to create email filters on the ~ ~:1 folders. 
For example, if a user receives unwanted mail from a 
specific source, he/she can create a filter that simply 
deletes such messages [13]. 
2. Pine 
Pine was developed at the University of Washington and 
runs on both UNIX and PCs. "The guiding principles for 
Pine's user interface were: careful limitation of features, 
one-character mnemonic commands, always-present command 
menus, immediate user feedback, and high tolerance for user 
mistakes. It is intended to be learned by exploration 
rather than reading manuals" [ 11] . Pi co, a message editor 
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that comes with Pine, can also act as a stand-alone editor. 
It offers very limited formatting such as justification and 
a spell checker. 
The key features of Pine are online help, a message 
index "that includes the status, sender, size, data and 
subject of [each] message"[11], a message composer, an 
address book, support for message attachments, Internet 
news and aggregate operations. Saving a selected set of 
messages at once is an aggregate operation. The primary 
advantage of Pine is that the source code is freely 
available [ 11] . 
3. Lotus Notes 
Lotus Notes offers a welcome page, bookmark bar for 
quick links to web pages, Notes application and Internet 
sites, window tabs; search, and email setup wizards. It 
supports Java, JavaScript and X. 509 certificates. Lotus 
Notes is supported on Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows NT 
4.0 workstation, Mac PowerPC 7,6 and 8.5 [15]. 
4. Microsoft Outlook 
Microsoft Outlook allows users to publish calendars as 
web pages, schedule group meetings quickly, communicate and 
collaborate with team members by publishing schedules on 
web sites, and manage contact information efficiently. Of 
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the five email clients, Microsoft Outlook offers the most 
features. 
The key features of Microsoft Outlook are inbox rules 
(email filters), storing of messages in multiple server 
folders, automatic dial-up of email accounts, ·offline 
storage of email messages (this feature depends on whether 
the email is stored on the server), digital signatures, and 
encryption. The availability of these features is 
dependent on the email server the client accesses [14]. 
5. Postal 
Postal, like Pine, is freely available over the 
Internet. It only allows a user to read his/her email not 
manipulate it. Postal provides users with access to their 
email anywhere on the Internet. It is derived from 
JavaMail, a Java email package that is "useful for 
accessing a variety of message-based systems, particularly 
IMAP" [12]. Because it is written in Java, Postal is based 
on the notion of classes (moveMessageMenu, Folder Menu, and 
the DynamicMenu) and objects (session, folder, message, and 
server, etc.). "The JavaMail package can produce a number 
of events to inform a program of various changes in the 
state of the email database or the connection to the 
database. In Postal, the MessageCount events are used to 
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indicate a change in the number of messages in the mail-
folder. To listen for events, the MailWatcher object 
implements the MessageCountListener interface, which 
provides the messageAdded () and messageRemoved () callback 
methods. The main() method adds a MessageWatcher object as 
a listener for MessageCountEvents so that it will be 
notified whenever new messages are added to the INBOX 
folder. Unfortunately, the user will not receive a message 
count event just because he or she is listening, at least 
not with IMAP. He or she will have to interact with the 
email server in order to know that new email has arrived. 
To perform this interaction, the MailWatcher objects 
provide the watch () method that periodically queries the 
server for new messages. The frequency of the check can be 
tuned using the interval option; otherwise, the client will 
check every sixty ( 60) seconds " [ 12] . 
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V. TESTING OF EMAIL CLIENTS 
A. PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO TESTING 
In order to utilize any of the email clients, the 
user must first invoke the trusted path between the server 
and the workstation, authenticate himself/herself with the 
server, and select both the integrity and secrecy levels 
for the session. Once the user has taken those steps, 
he/she can initiate one of the email programs (Postal, 
Messenger, Outlook, Pine, and Notes). 
When the user starts an email program from the client, 
IMAP sends a response back to the client that shows all its 
capabilities. Examples of some the responses are included 
in Appendix A. Once the user selects to read his/her 
email, the IMAP server then responds to the client with a 
list of all accessible mailboxes. After getting the list 
from IMAP, the user is free to select only one mailbox at a 
time. If the client is allowed to modify the mailbox at the 
current level, then IMAP responds to the client with a 
"read/write" indicator. If the client is not allowed to 
modify the email at a particular level, then IMAP responds 
with a "read only" indicator. For example, if a user were 
to logon at secret and issue the "select" command for his 
secret mailbox, then IMAP would respond with "read/write". 
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If the user is still logged on at secret and issues the 
"select II command for the confidential mailbox, IMAP would 
respond with "read only 11 • Since the MAC policy is being 
enforced by the XTS-300, the user is only allowed to 
manipulate data at his/her current sensitivity level. 
IMAP responses displayed to the users are dependent 
upon the particular email client that is currently being 
utilized. The six flags associated with each email message 
response and the twenty-two commands that manipulate the 
mailboxes and messages are described below[21]. 
FLAGS 
/Seen - the message has been read 
/Answered - the message has been answered 
(This may be a permanent flag) 
/Flagged - the message is "flagged" for special 
attention 
/Deleted - the message has been deleted and will be 
removed later by "Expunge" (This flag may be 
permanent) 
/Draft - the message is still being composed 
/Recent this is the first session in which the 





allows the user to select a specific 
• Examine - the same as the Select command, but this 
command is used for a read only mailbox 
• Create - creates a mailbox with a given name that 
follows the command 
• Delete - deletes a mailbox with a given name that 
follows the command 
• Rename - renames a selected mailbox 
• Subscribe - adds a specified mailbox to the server's 
list of active mailboxes 
• Unsubscribe - removes a mailbox from the server's 
list of active mailboxes 
• Lsub - returns a list of mailboxes that the user has 
declared as active using the Subscribe command 
• Status requests the status of the indicated 
mailbox without affecting the selected mailbox 
• Append places the literal argument as a new 
message at the end of the specified mailbox 
• Check - performs housekeeping on a specific mailbox 
(e.g. resolving the server's in-memory state of the 
mailbox with the state on its disk) 
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• Close - permanently removes all messages with the 
\deleted flag set and returns to the authenticated 
state (no mailbox selected) 
• Expunge - permanently removes all messages with the 
\Deleted flag set, but remains in the selected state 
• Search searches the mailbox for messages that 
match the specified search criteria 
• Fetch retrieves the requested data elements 
associated with the specified message(s) 
• Noop - always succeeds 
• Logout - closes the connection between the client 
and server 
• Capability - returns a listing of the capabilities 
that the server supports such as the version of IMAP 
• Store used to update or change the flags 
associated with the specified messages 
• Copy copies the selected message to the 
destination mailbox 
• UID - used to perform Copy, Fetch, and Search by the 
unique identifier instead of a sequence number. 
Therefore, UID takes one of those commands as an 
argument and performs the specified command 
according to the UID 
• List - returns a list of all the mailboxes that the 
user can access 
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B. TESTING CRITERIA FOR EMAIL CLIENTS 
The testing criteria are based on the feedback users 
receive regarding disallowed operations. These operations 
range from attempting to delete a message to attempting to 
write a message from a high sensi ti vi ty level to a low 
sensitivity level. Regardless of the operation, the user 
should receive some type of "user-friendly" message on the 
screen. In other words, the user should be informed 
whether specific operations are legal or illegal. 
Additionally, the users should also be informed whether or 
not an error has occurred in the system. Therefore, the 
following criteria were used to check the user-friendliness 
of the clients. 
• Ability to display the actual IMAP responses. When 
a client program interacts with the IMAP server, 
IMAP responds to the client program with a message. 
If the client program displays the actual IMAP 
response, then it passes this criterion. 
• Ability to display error messages to the user when 
an illegal operation has been performed 
• Ability to display a "user-friendly" message to the 
user 
• Ability to handle group email. Group email is email 
shared by multiple users on the server. IMAP does 
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not allow the email client programs to create group 
readable email. So, the owner of the group email 
must specify who can read the email. This is the 
DAC policy enforced. In order for that person to 
gain access, his or her sensitivity level must 
dominate that of the email. This is the MAC policy 
being enforced. 
• Ability to display "read only" on the mailboxes. 
For single-level systems all email is at one level. 
In these systems, users can perform all operations 
on their email. In multilevel systems, a user's 
access class may strictly dominate the access class 
of the mail. In this case, users cannot perform all 
operations on the email; therefore a user should be 
informed that he or she can only read an email; not 
manipulate it . So, if a sys tern can display this 
message, it greatly increases the friendliness of 
the system. For example, if the user wants to delete 
"read only" email, he or she would know that he or 
she must logon at the level of mail to perform the 
delete command. 
• Ability to display "read/write" on the mailboxes. 
This type of message informs the user that he/she 
can perform all operations on his/her email. 
Therefore, the user can delete, read, and reply to 
all email messages that are read/write. 
Additionally, if the email clients failed to meet any 
of the criteria, a determination as to the likelihood that 
the email client can be configured in some form or fashion 
to meet the criteria was determined. 
1. Netscape Messenger 
Netscape Messenger passed three of the six tests. It 
was not able to display "user friendly" messages to the 
user, or either display the "read only" or "read/write" 
indicators on the mailboxes. However, it was able to 
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,------------- -------------------
display the actual IMAP responses, error messages for 
illegal operations, and is capable of handling group email. 
Netscape Messenger searches for mailboxes designated for 
groups. If it finds one to which the user has access to, 
it presents that particular mailbox to the user. 
2. Pine 
Since both Pine and IMAP were developed at the 
University of Washington, the assumption was that it would 
have no problem interpreting the IMAP responses. Even 
though Pine does not have all the features of Microsoft 
Outlook and Netscape Messenger, it provided the most 
capabilities for the MLS LAN. The capabilities Pine 
provided are listed in the following paragraphs. 
Pine was able to satisfy four of the six testing 
criteria. It presented the user with the "read only" 
indicator, displayed the actual IMAP responses, and was 
able to handle group email. Pine also displayed useful 
messages to the user whenever he or she tried to perform 
both illegal and legal operations. However, Pine failed to 
properly display the "read/write" indicator and to display 
a user-friendly message to the user. In the case of the 
"read/write" indicator, Pine displayed a mailbox that was 
not followed by a [READ/WRITE] . Apparently, there is a 
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default in this email client program that specifies that if 
the mailbox is not "read only", display nothing. Pine, as 
with all the email clients, displays the actual IMAP 
responses. However, most users of the email clients 
probably would not understand those responses. Pine, like 
Netscape Messenger searches for mailboxes designated for 
groups. If it finds one that the user has access to, it 
presents that particular mailbox to the user. 
3. Lotus Notes 
Lotus Notes passed two of the six tests. It was not 
able to provide "user friendly" messages to the user, 
display either the· "read only" or "read/write" indicators 
on the mailboxes, or handle group mail. However, Lotus 




4. Microsoft OUtlook 
user concerning illegal/legal 
Because Microsoft Outlook is so robust and full of 
features, it was considered the likely candidate to pass a 
majority of the tests. In fact, Outlook passed only two of 
the six criteria. The points of failure for this email 
client were its inability to display "user friendly" 
messages, display the "read only" and "read/write" 
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indicators on the mailboxes, and handle group mail. This 
client was able to display the actual IMAP responses and 
display error messages to the user when legal and illegal 
operations were performed. It was also able to provide the 
user with messages when email was deleted or moved. 
5. Postal 
Postal lacks any ability to be evaluated under the set 
criteria because it only allows users to read their mail 
not manipulate it. However, when a user selects a mailbox, 
Postal sends the select command to the IMAP server. Postal 
was modified so if the IMAP server responded with the "read 
only" indicator, Postal would close the mailbox and issue 
the examine command to the IMAP server. By issuing this 
command, Postal is informing the IMAP server to open the 
mailbox in read only mode. Therefore, Postal has the 
capability to recognize the "read only" response from the 
IMAP server. Additionally, if the mailbox is open in "read 
only" mode, Postal won't issue any commands to modify the 
mailbox, such as changing the flags. This is because 
Postal caches the fact that the mailbox was open in "read 
only" mode. Unfortunately, all this interaction between 
Postal and the IMAP server is occurring without the 
knowledge of the user. However, Postal does provide error 
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messages when the user tries to perform an invalid 
operation. 
Table 2 Results of Tests 
NETSCAPE LOTES PINE POSTAL MICROSOFT 
MESSENGER NOTES OUTLOOK 
--DISPLAYS 
IMAP YES YES YES NO YES 
COMMANDS 
DISPLAYS 
ERROR YES YES YES YES YES 
MESSAGES 
DISPLAYS 




GROUP YES NO YES NO NO 
MAIL 
DISPLAYS 










VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. FUTURE WORK 
Additional work on the email client programs is 
required in order to improve the user interfaces. The 
ability of these email clients to present the user with 
more descriptive information increases the usability of the 
MLS system. Therefore, more features such as group mail or 
hierarchical classes could be added to the client programs 
such as Microsoft Outlook and Lotus Notes. In the cases 
where the email clients do not display the "read only" and 
"read/write" indicators, the code of the clients could be 
modified to display the response from the server. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
System development is usually a long and tedious 
process and may involve many iterations. The Human Computer 
Interface (HCI) should be included in the specification of 
any system. Companies should not waste countless man-hours 
and money building systems without first considering the 
users who will interact with these systems. If the users 
are considered from the beginning of the development of 
software and hardware, more systems might succeed. 
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An MLS environment helps to eliminate equipment 
duplication, excessive clearances, incoherent content and 
untimely information. However, eliminating these problems 
does not guarantee users will embrace the system. 
Therefore, the MLS environment should also provide a 
meaningful user interface. One of the ways to accomplish 
this task is to make email more "user friendly" in a 
multilevel environment. 
In this thesis, five email clients were evaluated to 








in a multilevel 
according to the 
capabilities of each email program. Unfortunately, none of 
the email clients could be configured to display more 
"user-friendly" messages. In order for these email client 
programs to p~ovide a better user interface, the developer 
would need to change the client code or make the source 
code freely so that others could make these modifications. 
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APPENDIX A. IMAP SESSION 
This is an IMAP session. "Send to Client" is the 
response from the IMAP server and "Send to Server'' is the 
command from Microsoft Outlook. 
Send to CLIENT [* PREAUTH 
holmes.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil IMAP4rev1 v12.256 server 
ready] 
Send to SERVER [0000 CAPABILITY] 
Send to CLIENT [* CAPABILITY IMAP4 IMAP4REV1 
NAMESPACE IDLE SCAN SORT MAILBOX-REFERRALS LOGIN-
REFERRALS AUTH=LOGIN THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT 
0000 OK CAPABILITY completed] 
Send to SERVER [0001 IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [0001 OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [0002 LIST 1" 1 "*"] 
Send to CLIENT [*LIST (\NoSelect) "/" unclass 
* LIST (\Noinferiors \UnMarked) "/" unclass/xbox 
* LIST (\NoSelect) "/" conf 
*LIST (\Noinferiors \UnMarked) "/" conf/xbox 
* LIST (\NoSelect) "/" secret 
* LIST (\Noinferiors \UnMarked) "/" secret/xbox 
* LIST (\NoSelect) "/" topsecret 
* LIST (\Noinferiors \UnMarked) "/" topsecret/xbox 
* LIST (\Noinferiors} NIL INBOX 
0002 OK LIST completed] 
Send to SERVER [0003 LSUB "" "*"] 
Send to CLIENT [* LSUB () "/" unclass/xbox 
* LSUB (\Noinferiors) NIL INBOX 
* LSUB () "/" conf/xbox 
* LSUB () "/" secret/xbox 
* LSUB () "/" topsecret/xbox 
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* LSUB (\Noinferiors) NIL INBOX 
0003 OK LSUB completed] 
Send to SERVER [0004 UNSUBSCRIBE "INBOX"] 
Send to SERVER [0005 LIST "" "INBOX*"] 
Send to CLIENT [0004 OK UNSUBSCRIBE completed 
* LIST (\Noinferiors) NIL INBOX 
0005 OK LIST completed] 
Send to SERVER [0006 LSUB "" "INBOX*"] 
Send to CLIENT [* LSUB (\Noinferiors) NIL INBOX 
0006 OK LSUB completed] 
Send to SERVER [0007 IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
LOAD: Child Process ID - 4290 
Send to CLIENT [* PREAUTH 
holmes.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil IMAP4revl vl2.256 server 
ready] 
Send to SERVER [0008 CAPABILITY] 
Send to CLIENT [* CAPABILITY IMAP4 IMAP4REV1 
NAMESPACE IDLE SCAN SORT MAILBOX-REFERRALS LOGIN-
REFERRALS AUTH=LOGIN THREAD=ORDEREDSUBJECT 
0008 OK CAPABILITY completed] 
Send to SERVER [0009 IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [0009 OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOA SELECT "topsecret/xbox"] 
Send to CLIENT [* 3 EXISTS 
* 0 RECENT 
* OK [UIDVALIDITY 968263650] UID validity status 
* OK [UIDNEXT 4] Predicted next UID 
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* FLAGS (\Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Draft \Seen) 
* OK [ PERMANENTFLAGS ( \ * \Answered \Flagged \Deleted 
\Draft \Seen)] Permanent flags 
* OK [UNSEEN 1] first unseen message in 
/usr2/mail/shifflet/topsecret/xbox 
OOOA OK [READ-WRITE] SELECT completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOB IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOB OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOC UID FETCH 1:* 
(BODY.PEEK[HEADER.FIELDS (References X-Ref X-Priority 
X-MSMail-Priority Newsgroups)] ENVELOPE RFC822.SIZE 
UID FLAGS INTERNALDATE)] 
Send to CLIENT [* 1 FETCH (UID 1 BODY[HEADER.FIELDS 




ENVELOPE ("Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:39:38 -0700" "Test 4 
from Outlook" ( ("dave" NIL "dave" "here")) ( ("dave" 
NIL "dave" "here")) (("dave" NIL "dave" "here")) ((NIL 
NIL "shifflet" "holmes") ("Emma J Brown" NIL "ejbrown" 
"holmes.astro.cs.nps.na'Vy.mil") (NIL NIL "everette" 
"holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<000701c019bb$c8180510$540a7883@astro.cs.nps.navy.mil 
>") RFC822. SIZE 464 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE " 8-Sep-2000 
17:42:00 +0000") 
* 2 FETCH (UID 2 BODY[HEADER.FIELDS ("REFERENCES" "X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
ENVELOPE ("Fri, 08 Sep 2000 10:40:50 -0700" "Test 4 
from Netscape" ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry. astro. cs. nps. navy .mil")) ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ((NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") (NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<39B924A2.D5608B1A@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") 
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RFC822.SIZE 434 FLAGS 
17:43:00 +0000") 
( ) INTERNALDATE .. 8-Sep-2000 
* 3 FETCH (UID 3 BODY[HEADER.FIELDS ("REFERENCES" "X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
ENVELOPE ( "Fri, 
Daylight Time) " 
8 Sep 2000 10:43:44 -0700 (Pacific 
"Test 4 from Pine" ( ("David Shifflett" 
NIL "dave" "astro. cs. nps. navy .mil")) ( ("David 
Shifflett" 
(("David 
NIL "dave" "astro. cs .nps .navy .mil")) 
Shifflett" NIL "dave" 
"astro. cs. nps. navy .mil")) ( (NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") (NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes II) ) NIL NIL NIL 
"<Pine.WNT.4.20.0009081043090.258-
100000@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") RFC822.SIZE 417 
FLAGS() INTERNALDATE" 8-Sep-2000 17:46:00 +0000") 
OOOC OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOD UID FETCH 1:3 (UID FLAGS)] 
Send to CLIENT [* 1 FETCH (UID 1 FLAGS ()) 
* 2 FETCH (UID 2 FLAGS ()) 
* 3 FETCH (UID 3 FLAGS ()) 
OOOD OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOE IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOE OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOF CLOSE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOF OK CLOSE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOG IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOG OK IDLE completed] 
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Send to SERVER [OOOH SELECT "secret/xbox"] 
Send to CLIENT [* 3 EXISTS 
* 0 RECENT 
* OK [UIDVALIDITY 968263650] UID validity status 
* OK [UIDNEXT 4] Predicted next UID 
* FLAGS (\Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Draft \Seen) 
*OK [PERMANENTFLAGS ()] Permanent flags 
* OK [UNSEEN 1] first unseen message in 
/usr2/mail/shifflet/secret/xbox 
OOOH OK [READ-ONLY] SELECT completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOI IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOI OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOJ UID FETCH 1:* 
(BODY.PEEK[HEADER.FIELDS (References X-Ref X-Priority 
X-MSMail-Priority Newsgroups)] ENVELOPE RFC822.SIZE 
UID FLAGS INTERNALDATE)] 
Send to CLIENT [ * 1 FETCH (UID 1 BODY [HEADER. FIELDS 




ENVELOPE ("Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:34:29 -0700" "Test 3 
from Outlook" ( ("dave" NIL "dave" "here")) ( ("dave" 
NIL "dave" "here")) ( ("dave" NIL "dave" "here")) ((NIL 
NIL "shifflet" "holmes") ("Emma J Brown" NIL "ejbrown" 
"holmes. astro. cs .nps .navy .mil") (NIL NIL "everette" 
"holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<000701c019bb$10ca3540$540a7883@astro.cs.nps.navy.mil 
>") RFC822.SIZE 463 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE " 8-Sep-2000 
17:37:00 +0000") 
* 2 FETCH ( UID 2 BODY [HEADER. FIELDS ( II REFERENCES II II X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
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ENVELOPE ( "Fri, 08 Sep 2000 10:35:48 -0700" "Test 3 
from Netscape'' ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) (("kip'' NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) (("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ((NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") (NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<39B92374.4C6E8359@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") 
RFC822.SIZE 429 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE 8-Sep-2000 
17:38:00 +0000") 
* 3 FETCH ( UID 3 BODY [HEADER. FIELDS ( II REFERENCES II II X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
ENVELOPE ( "Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:37:45 -0700 (Pacific 
Daylight Time)" "Test 3 from Pine" ( ("David Shifflett" 
NIL "dave" "astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) (("David 
Shifflett" NIL "dave" "astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) 
(("David Shifflett" NIL "dave" 
"astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ((NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") (NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<Pine.WNT.4.20.0009081037100.307-
100000@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") RFC822.SIZE 414 
FLAGS () INTERNALDATE " 8-Sep-2000 17:40:00 +0000") 
OOOJ OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOK UID FETCH 1:3 (UID FLAGS)] 
Send·to CLIENT [* 1 FETCH (UID 1 FLAGS ()) 
* 2 FETCH (UID 2 FLAGS ()) 
* 3 FETCH (UID 3 FLAGS ()) 
OOOK OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOL IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [ + Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOL OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [ OOOM CLOSE] 
Send to CLIENT [ OOOM OK CLOSE completed] 
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Send to SERVER [OOON IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOON OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [0000 SELECT "conf/xbox"] 
Send to CLIENT [* 4 EXISTS 
* 0 RECENT 
* OK [UIDVALIDITY 968361985] UID validity status 
* OK [UIDNEXT 5] Predicted next UID 
* FLAGS (\Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Draft \Seen) 
*OK [PERMANENTFLAGS ()] Permanent flags 
* OK [UNSEEN 1] first unseen message in 
/usr2 /mail I shi.fflet I conf /xbox 
0000 OK [READ-ONLY] SELECT completed] 
Send to SERVER 
Send to CLIENT 
Send to SERVER 
Send to CLIENT 
[OOOP IDLE] 
[+ Ready for argument] 
[DONE] 
[OOOP OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOQ UID FETCH 1:* 
(BODY.PEEK[HEADER.FIELDS (References X-Ref X-Priority 
X-MSMail-Priority Newsgroups)] ENVELOPE RFC822.SIZE 
UID FLAGS INTERNALDATE)] 
Send to CLIENT [ * 1 FETCH (UID 1 BODY [HEADER. FIELDS 
("REFERENCES" "X-REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" 
"NEWSGROUPS")] {2} 
ENVELOPE ("Wed, 06 Sep 2000 10:47:54 -0700" "Test of 
multi-addressees via netscape" ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry. astro. cs. nps. navy .mil")) ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) (("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ((NIL NIL "ejbrown" 
"holmes.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil") (NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<39B6834A.B3E9F28F@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") 
RFC822.SIZE 507 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE " 6-Sep-2000 
17:49:00 +0000") 
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* 2 FETCH ( UID 2 BODY [HEADER. FIELDS ( II REFERENCES II II X-




ENVELOPE ("Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:28:56 -0700" "Test 2 
from Outlook" ( ("dave" NIL "dave" "here")) ( ("dave" 
NIL "dave" "here")) ( ("dave" NIL "dave" "here")) ((NIL 
NIL "shifflet" "holmes") ("Emma J Brown" NIL "ejbrown" 
"holmes. as tro. cs. nps. navy. mi 1" ) (NIL NIL "everet te" 
"holmes") ) NIL NIL NIL 
"<000701c019ba$4a4bbla0$540a7883@astro.cs.nps.navy.mil 
>") RFC822.SIZE 457 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE " 8-Sep-2000 
17:31:00 +0000") 
* 3 FETCH (UID 3 BODY [HEADER.FIELDS ("REFERENCES" "X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
ENVELOPE ("Fri, 08 Sep 2000 10:30:31 -0700" "Test 2 
from Netscape" ( (''kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) (("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) (("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ({NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") {NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<39B92237.D511F6B6@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") 
RFC822.SIZE 429 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE 8-Sep-2000 
17:33:00 +0000") 
* 4 FETCH (UID 4 BODY[HEADER.FIELDS ("REFERENCES" "X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
ENVELOPE ("Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:32:35 -0700 (Pacific 
Daylight Time)" "Test 2 from Pine" ( {''David Shifflett" 
NIL "dave" "astro. cs. nps. navy .mil") ) ( ("David 
Shifflett" NIL "dave" "astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) 
{ ("David Shifflett" NIL "dave" 
"astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ((NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") {NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<Pine.WNT.4.20.0009081031530.188-
100000@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") RFC822.SIZE 414 
FLAGS () INTERNALDATE '' 8-Sep-2000 17:35:00 +0000") 
OOOQ OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOR UID FETCH 1:4 (UID FLAGS)] 
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Send to CLIENT [* 1 FETCH (UID 1 FLAGS ( ) ) 
* 2 FETCH (UID 2 FLAGS ()) 
* 3 FETCH (UID 3 FLAGS ()) 
* 4 FETCH (UID 4 FLAGS ()) 
OOOR OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [ 00 OS IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [ + Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOS OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOT CLOSE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOT OK CLOSE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOU IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [ + Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOU OK IDLE completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOV SELECT 
Send to CLIENT [* 2 EXISTS 
* 0 RECENT 
"unclass/xbox"] 
* OK [UIDVALIDITY 968361947] UID validity status 
*OK [UIDNEXT 3] Predicted next·UID 
* FLAGS (\Answered \Flagged \Deleted \Draft \Seen) 
*OK [PERMANENTFLAGS ()] Permanent flags 
* OK [UNSEEN 1] first unseen message in 
/usr2/mail/shifflet/unclass/xbox 
OOOV OK [READ-ONLY] SELECT completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOW IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
Send to SERVER [DONE] 
Send to CLIENT [OOOW OK IDLE completed] 
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Send to SERVER [OOOX UID FETCH 1:* 
(BODY.PEEK[HEADER.FIELDS (References X-Ref X-Priority 
X-MSMail-Priority Newsgroups)] ENVELOPE RFC822.SIZE 
UID FLAGS INTERNALDATE)] 
Send to CLIENT [ * 1 FETCH (UID 1 BODY [HEADER. FIELDS 
("REFERENCES" "X-REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" 
"NEWSGROUPS")] {2} 
ENVELOPE ("Fri, 08 Sep 2000 10:22:59 -0700" "Test 1 
from Netscape" ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry. astro. cs. nps .navy .mil")) ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry. astro. cs. nps. navy .mil")) ( ("kip" NIL "kip" 
"henry. astro. cs. nps. navy .mil")) {(NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes") (NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes") (NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<39B92073.342DC4A6@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") 
RFC822.SIZE 432 FLAGS () INTERNALDATE 8-Sep-2000 
17:25:00 +0000") 
* 2 FETCH ( UID 2 BODY [HEADER . FIELDS ( "REFERENCES " "X-
REF" "X-PRIORITY" "X-MSMAIL-PRIORITY" "NEWSGROUPS")] 
{2} 
ENVELOPE ("Fri, 8 Sep 2000 10:26:15 -0700 (Pacific 
Daylight Time)" "Test 1 from Pine" ( ("David Shifflett" 
NIL "dave" "astro. cs .nps .navy .mil")) ( ("David 
Shifflett" NIL "dave" "astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) 
(("David Shifflett" NIL "dave" 
"astro.cs.nps.navy.mil")) ((NIL NIL "shifflet" 
"holmes")(NIL NIL "ejbrown" "holmes")(NIL NIL 
"everette" "holmes")) NIL NIL NIL 
"<Pine.WNT.4.20.0009081025290.303-
100000@henry.astro.cs.nps.navy.mil>") RFC822.SIZE 420 
FLAGS () INTERNALDATE " 8-Sep-2000 17:29:00 +0000") 
OOOX OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOY UID FETCH 1:2 (UID FLAGS)] 
Send to CLIENT [* 1 FETCH {UID 1 FLAGS {)) 
* 2 FETCH (UID 2 FLAGS ()) 
OOOY OK UID FETCH completed] 
Send to SERVER [OOOZ IDLE] 
Send to CLIENT [+ Ready for argument] 
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Send to SERVER [DONE] ZZZZ LOGOUT] 
Send to SERVER [DONE]ZZZZ LOGOUT] 
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